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CB1R on the glutamate terminals was confirmed by
showing that a synthetic CB1R agonist did not suppress
excitatory transmission in CamKII-CB12/2 or Glu-CB12/2
animals (although it did in wt). The question, therefore, is
not whether the mutants are the genuine articles, but
how and how readily the endocannabinoids that nor-
mally activate CB1Rs on glutamate terminals are mobi-
lized. Unlike DSE in the cerebellum, which is prominent
and easily induced by physiologically relevant stimuli
(Kreitzer and Regehr, 2001), DSE in the hippocampus
is not generated by stimuli that produce DSI (Ohno-
Shosaku et al., 2002) and at best only modestly reduces
glutamate release. Endocannabinoids are generated by
both Ca2+- and G protein-coupled receptor pathways,
which may differ biochemically (Edwards et al., 2006).
It will be important to work out the biochemical and
indeed the cellular source of neuroprotective endo-
cannabinoids.
What is the neuroprotective endocannabinoid? Glu-
tamate stimulates production of 2-AG but not ananda-
mide in the hippocampus (Stella et al., 1997). Moreover,
a recent report finds CB1Rs expressed on the hippo-
campal glutamatergic axons and a key biochemical
component of the 2-AG synthetic pathway positioned
on dendritic spines directly across from the terminals
(Katona et al., 2006). The 2-AG system is therefore ide-
ally positioned and poised to mediate neuroprotection.
The prediction is that 2-AG levels should be increased
during seizures. Yet direct endocannabinoid measure-
ments by Marsicano et al. (2003) did not confirm this
expectation: KA treatment increased anandamide but
not 2-AG levels. It seems there are still subtleties
regarding endocannabinoids, their regulation and
function, that provide ample opportunities for future
discoveries.
Finally, it was once cynically remarked that the lesion
approach to understanding the brain is like trying to
learn how a television set works by disabling one tube
at a time with a hammer (those unfamiliar with ‘‘tube’’
in this context should consult an older person). Seeing
the picture dissolve into a mass of wavy lines following
the breaking of a particular tube might lead to the con-
clusion that it had functioned primarily as the ‘‘wavy
line suppressor’’; the intricacy of the truth obscured by
the dramatic effects caused by the malfunction. It is
worth bearing in mind that, although the hammers and
tubes grow smaller, such concerns do not entirely go
away.
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395The Rodent Orbitofrontal Cortex
Gets Time and Direction
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) helps direct decision
making through its flexible coding of reward and eco-
nomic value. In this issue ofNeuron, papers byRoesch
et al. and Feierstein et al. demonstrate the importance
of temporal and spatial features to processing in the
rodent OFC.
Imagine you are thirsty. You can get a small drink imme-
diately, or if you wait 10 minutes you can get a larger
drink that will more fully quench your thirst. Do you drink
now or wait for the larger drink? Alternatively, imagine
that you can cash-in a ticket today for $100 or wait
2 weeks and get $125. Do you cash it in now or wait?
Across multiple species there is a substantial preference
for immediate rewards over delayed rewards, even
when the immediate reward is of lower magnitude (see
Figure 1). The process through which rewards are deval-
ued over increasing delays is referred to as ‘‘temporal
discounting’’ and is a critical component of neuroeco-
nomic models. Lesions to certain brain areas can
change the slope of the temporal discounting function.
Among such brain regions, the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) appears unique, in that lesions to the OFC in
rodents lessen the bias toward immediate rewards
(Winstanley et al., 2004).
In the present issue of Neuron, Roesch, Taylor and
Schoenbaum (Roesch et al., 2006) demonstrate that
OFC cells are sensitive to the temporal features of re-
wards in a manner consistent with temporal discount-
ing. The authors trained rodents in a task in which the
spatial location of the reward predicted the delay pre-
ceding reward delivery. OFC cells that responded to re-
wards were common. In 40% of these reward-sensitive
cells, rewards delivered after a short delay produced
significantly greater responses than those delivered af-
ter a long delay, demonstrating a temporal discounting
effect. In another 17% of cells, the opposite effect was
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the anticipation or receipt of rewards after longer delays.
Because cells with greater responses to immediate re-
wards outnumber those with the opposite pattern by
a 2:1 ratio, the net effect is a devaluation of rewards
over time.
Time is not the only factor that influences reward val-
uation. Imagine again that you are thirsty, but this time
you are offered a small glass of your favorite drink or
a large glass of an acceptable but less preferred drink.
Which do you pick? How much more of the less pre-
ferred drink would have to be offered for you to pick it in-
stead of the smaller preferred beverage? The neuro-
physiological literature indicates that OFC cells are
sensitive to both preference (Tremblay and Schultz,
1999) and reward amount (Wallis and Miller, 2003). In-
deed, a recent study by Padoa-Schioppa and Assad
(2006) indicates that some cells in the monkey medial
OFC (Walker’s area 13) fire based on the overall value
(combination of preference and amount) of offered and
chosen rewards. In such cases, the firing appears to re-
flect a common valuation that is independent of the spe-
cific rewards. This type of common valuation is generally
posited in neuroeconomic models, in that it allows re-
ward information to be conveyed as a unitary variable ir-
respective of its specific sensory features (Sugrue et al.,
2005).
Like its apparent role in the devaluation of rewards
with time, the OFC also appears to be critical to other
forms of reward devaluation, such as when a reward be-
comes linked to an aversive stimulus (Baxter et al., 2000;
Izquierdo et al., 2004) or when a nonpreferred reward is
received instead of a preferred reward (Tremblay and
Schultz, 1999). Given these similarities, one might spec-
ulate that temporal discounting and reward magnitude
operate using a common neural coding in the OFC. How-
ever, the data presented by Roesch et al. argue against
this idea. Only a minority of the reward-responsive cells
examined in this study were sensitive to reward amount,
and there was no association between cells that were
modulated by reward amount and those that were mod-
ulated by temporal factors. In other words, the rodent
OFC appears to code for the temporal features of reward
in a manner that is dissociable from reward amount,
rather than using a single common valuation system.
To date, models of OFC functioning have emphasized
its role in reward processing and its ability to make flex-
ible stimulus-reward associations. Spatial or spatial-
Figure 1. Rewards Become Discounted with Increasing Delays
At long delays, the delayed reward must be substantially larger than
the immediate reward to overcome the bias to choose an immediate
reward.motor correlates have generally been absent, and in
cases where OFC lesions have impaired spatial tasks
they have typically been dismissed as relating to more
general features such as reward processing or persever-
ative tendencies. Studies of OFC cells have generally
found OFC responses to be relatively independent of
spatial task features. For instance, in the study by
Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2006) described above,
fewer than 5% of the monkey OFC cells responded to
the spatial or motor features of the task. Wallis and Miller
(2003) reported a somewhat greater prevalence of mon-
key OFC cells that showed location specificity, but such
cells were far less common than those seen in the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex, and the majority of OFC firing
appeared independent of the behavioral response or
spatial properties of rewards.
Given this context, it is striking that in the present is-
sue both Roesch et al. and Feierstein et al. report a large
proportion of rodent OFC cells that show spatially selec-
tive responses. While the topic is not the focus of the
Roesch et al. paper, Feierstein and colleagues explore
this issue in depth (Feierstein et al., 2006). The authors
used an alternative choice task in which odors indicated
which of two spatial locations (ports) would have water
available on any given trial. Remarkably, 41% of the re-
corded cells showed selective firing to the right or left
port during the animal’s response (as it turned to and
moved to the port). These cells appeared to be particu-
larly tuned to the direction in which the animal was turn-
ing or moving, rather than a specific place location.
Many of these cells showed sustained activity while
the animal moved in a given direction, with the firing
rate correlating with the speed of movement. Based on
the timing of these responses (most of which did not
fire until after the start of the animal’s movements) and
the lack of direct projections to motor execution path-
ways, the authors suggest that these cells are not cod-
ing the decision to move or the execution of movement
per se, but are reflecting the monitoring of spatial goals.
As expected based on previous literature, OFC neurons
also selectively responded to whether or not a reward
(water) was received, with some cells firing when there
was a reward and more firing when the reward was omit-
ted. Around a third of these outcome-selective cells
were also selective for which side the animal had gone
to, potentially allowing an integration of directional
and outcome information that could be used for future
decisions.
What are the implications of such a spatial or direc-
tional component to the rodent OFC? At the simplest
level, the finding suggests that spatial issues must be
carefully attended to in models of rodent OFC process-
ing. Previous work with rodents implicated the OFC
in olfactory-location associative learning (Lipton et al.,
1999), but the present finding suggests a far broader
role involving the monitoring, maintenance, and updat-
ing of spatial goals in the pursuit of rewards. This runs
counter to the prevailing models of OFC functioning
that have arisen from the primate literature, which em-
phasize the OFC’s role in processing information about
the details of rewards or reward-stimulus associations,
but minimize spatial or action-oriented processing. To
the extent that spatial tasks (such as delayed spatial al-
ternation) are impaired after OFC lesions in primates and
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nonspatial factors, such as perseveration or a failure of
working memory for reward information (Zald et al.,
2002). Indeed, the scarcity of monkey OFC cells that
fire in relation to behavioral actions per se has led to ar-
guments that the OFC processes a relative pure valua-
tion of rewards that is independent of the actions neces-
sary to obtain the objects. Such a pure valuation would
lead to a goods-based decision process in which
choices are made based on the valuation of the available
rewards, as opposed to an action-based decision pro-
cess in which decisions are made about which action
to take to obtain rewards. The involvement of the rodent
OFC in directional coding runs counter to a pure reward
model of OFC functioning. While directional features do
not contradict the OFC’s contribution to a goods-based
decision process, they indicate that a substantial por-
tion of OFC processing is related to action information
in the rodent.
In considering the apparent conflict between the new
rodent data and the existing monkey literature, we must
address the degree to which the rodent OFC and the hu-
man and nonhuman primate OFC can be considered ho-
mologous. The rodent OFC is far less developed than
what is seen in monkeys or humans in that it lacks the
rostral granular regions that typify the primate prefrontal
cortex. However, on the basis of thalamic and other con-
nections, an area of the rodent cortex that contains sim-
ilar connections to the primate OFC is definable. The ro-
dent OFC is commonly divided (from medial to lateral)
into medial orbital (MO), ventrolateral orbital (VLO), lat-
eral orbital (LO), and agranular insular (AI) regions (Kret-
tek and Price, 1977). The study by Roesch et al. focuses
primarily on cells located in area LO, while the study by
Feierstein et al. includes cells in area VLO and to a lesser
extent LO. The thalamic, ventral striatal, and amygdalar
connections of these two areas have similarities to the
primate medial OFC region (with area VLO showing sim-
ilarities to primate areas 13a and b, and LO showing sim-
ilarities to areas 13m and 13l) (Price, 2006). Arguments
for cross-species similarities (if not homology) have
also been supported by lesion and electrophysiological
studies, especially in relation to aspects of reward pro-
cessing (see Roesch and Schoenbaum, 2006). However,
there are also likely to be substantial cross-species dif-
ferences, and the issue of spatial processing could be
one of them. Lesions to rodent OFC, particularly VLO,
produce deficits in spatial navigation and even spatial
neglect (Corwin et al., 1994; King et al., 1989), whereas
similar observations are absent from both the human
and nonhuman primate literatures. In rodents, area
VLO receives strong projections from posterior parietal
cortex (Reep et al., 1996), whereas a similar projection
has never been emphasized in primates. Thus, it is pos-
sible that the OFC may be involved in directional pro-
cessing in rodents to a degree not seen in primates. Sim-
ilar spatial features would need to be demonstrated in
the monkey or human before generalizing these results
beyond rodent models. Nevertheless, even if they do
not generalize, it is now clear that spatial issues must
be addressed in rodent studies of OFC functions, and
these issues may have a substantial impact on models
of how the OFC contributes to decision-making and
reward-motivated behavior.David H. Zald1
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